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THE ROLE OF RISK ASSESSMENT IN FACILITY SITING: 
AN EXAMPLE FROM CALIFORNIA 
John W. Lathrop 
As the number and scale of energy facilities increase, govern- 
ment agencies are  faced with more and more difficult decisions involving 
the management of societal risk. Since the risks can be complex and not 
well understood. risk management decisions can be extremely difficult to 
make. I t  would seem, then, that there should be an important role for 
formal analyses in assessing risks 'to aid those decisions. This paper ex- 
plores that role in the context of the attempted siting of a Liquefied Na- 
tural Gas (LNG) facility on the California coast. While the first site appli- 
cation was filed in 1973, as of this writing (October 1980) no site has been 
approved. The story of those eight years, a fascinating case study in so- 
cietal risk management, has been told and analyzed with insight by two of 
the participants in the process: William Ahern (1980a,b) and Randolph 
Deutsch (1980). This paper concentrates on one aspect of one episode in 
that  siting process, taking the point of view of the frustrated decision 
analyst, trying to understand the role his tools play--and could play--in 
the political process of siting. After investigating that  role, the paper 
concludes with some brief and very general recommendations as to what 
research is called for to make those tools more useful. 
 he research reported in this paper is supported by the Bundesmin- 
isteriurn fiir Forschung und Technologie, F.R.G., contract no. 
321/7591/RGB 8001. While support for t.his work is gratefully ack- 
nowledged, the views expressed are the author's own, and are  not neces- 
sarily shared by the  sponsor. 
In early 1977, state and federal regulatory agencies were favor- 
ing an  LNG terminal site a t  Oxnard, California. As par t  of the site appro- 
val procedure, assessments of the risks to surrounding areas due to the 
LNG terminal had been done by the federal regulatory staff (Federal 
2 Power Commission, FPC). and by consultants hired by the gas company 
(Science Applications. Inc., SAI). Both risk assessments estimated the 
probabilities of each of many possible accidents and derived from them 
various measures of the risk in probabilistic terms. such as  expected 
numbers of fatalities, probability of fatality per exposed person per year, 
etc. The implicit goal of both of these assessments was to  measure the  
risk in summary terms that  could assist in the determination of whether 
or  not the risk was low enough for the site to  be acceptable. Both assess- 
ments indicated that  the LNG risks to  Oxnard were extremely low or 
negligible (SAI 1975; FPC 1976). The appropriate federal agency deemed 
the  Oxnard terminal acceptably safe, and approved it in December 1977. 
Considering all of these events, things seemed to  be moving smoothly to- 
ward approval for the Oxnard terminal. However, the  city of Oxnard had 
commissioned another consulting firm, Socio-Economic Systems. Inc. 
(SES) to  do an  environmental impact report. As part  of that  effort, SES 
did its own risk assessment, which combined assumptions and model 
results from SAI, FPC, and U.S. Coast Guard studies to  calculate about 5.7 
expected annual fatalities as a summary measure of the risk of the LNG 
terminal (SES 1976). This was about 380 times higher than the 
corresponding estimate by SAI. However, according to  Ahern (1980a) the 
politically more important part  of the SES report was a set  of descrip- 
tions of several deterministic worst case scenarios, with flammable vapor 
clouds covering up to 70,000 people, presented without estimated proba- 
bilities of occurrence. The publication of those scenarios "electrified op- 
position t o  the terminal," to  quote Ahern. 
In the face of opposition to the terrninal based on concern for 
safety, the California state legislature passed the LNG Terminal Act of 
1977 (S.B.1081, September), which excluded the Oxnard site. That bill 
may have passed with or without the SES worst case scenarios, but the 
fact remains that the SAI and FPC probabilistic risk assessments did not 
help the  gas company or the  regulatory agencies gauge the actual politi- 
cal acceptability of the Oxnard site. The assessments could have been in- 
tended for any of several purposes, among them two in particular: t o  
warn the company away from a site where i t  would be  imposing politically 
unacceptable risk, or to  convince all appropriate government agencies 
tha t  the  site was acceptably safe. Measured against either of these two 
purposes, the SAI and FPC risk assessments failed. This paper presents 
and discusses four very general reasons for this failu.re: 
2 ~ h e  FPC staff more or less became the  Federal Energy Regulatory Com- 
mission (FERC) staff in the course of the creation of the Department of 
Energy in 1.977. Their work will be referred t o  as the FPC assessment 
throughout this paper. 
differences in definition and evaluation of risk 
differences in approaches to risk management 
the  nature of the role of analysis in the political process, 
the  nature of the  political process itself 
The last section of the paper summarizes the lessons that  can  be learned 
f rom the  discussions of these points, bringing them together in the form 
of very brief descriptions of the most promising areas for research 
directed a t  improving the usefulness of risk assessment in the political 
siting process. 
11. DIFFERENCES IN DEFINITION AN11 EVALUATION OF RISK 
Given the extent of controversy surrounding questions of socie- 
tal risk, it seems odd that  the debate goes on without a clear definition of 
what risk is. In fact, this section suggests that differences in definitions 
of risk are basic parts  of the problem of managing societal risk. 
A. FOCUSING THE DISCUSSION 
An LNG siting problem, a s  discussed here, consists of two inter- 
dependent decisions: whether or  not t,o have the LNG project, and if so, 
where to site the plant(s). A disinterested observer might view these  de- 
cisions as involving the  consideration of very uncertain benefits and 
losses, all viewed in relation to  the  alternative action (pipeline, oil, coal, 
nuclear, conservation. other site). The LNG plant could cause an  uncer- 
tain reduction in the  num-ber and severity of supply interruptions, an 
uncertain change in the finances of the  utility and its customers, an unc- 
ertain loss of flora and fauna, an uncertain degradation in people's enjoy- 
ment  of the coast, an uncertain reductior~ in air pollution health effects, 
and an  uncertain increase in accident-related loss of life and limb. While 
these statements suggest directions of LNG plant effects (reduction, in- 
crease, etc.), those directions depend on what alternative is assumed to 
take the place of the LNG project if i t  is not permitted, and on assump- 
tions made in the related analyses. While it  would be interesting t o  con- 
sider all of the  factors listed, this paper focuses on health effects, includ- 
ing air pollution effects and accident.-related loss of life and limb, factors 
central  to  the example given in the  introduction. The word "risk" is used 
to  denote some measure of those uncertain losses, reflecting the  typical 
use of the word in such terms a s  risk assessment and societal risk. Even 
with this focus, uncertain health effects a re  many-dimensional things, so 
tha t  any definition of risk rnust involve assumptions concerning how those 
losses are to  b e  evaluated. That is the source of a key aspect of the  socie- 
tal risk rnanagement problem: There a r e  two different types of definitions 
of risk, which arise from two basically different perspectives on risk, 
technical and societal. These two perspectives can lead to substantial.ly 
different evaluations of the  acceptability of the risk resulting from an 
LNG alternat.ive. 
B. TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE 
From the technical perspective, risk is some probability distri- 
bution over sets of health effects. For example, in one paper Keeney 
(1980a) defines the risk of a technology as a probability distribution over 
sets of probabilities 1 p i , i = l ,  . . . , N 1, each set  denoted in short as pi 1, 
where p, is the probability that  the i th  individual of a group of N individu- 
als will die due to the technology before the end of the next time period. 
The probability sets I pi  1 are constructed in such a way that  within each 
set, each probability is independent of any other. The probability distri- 
bution over those sets is required to represent probabilistic dependencies 
between the fatalities. For example, in the LNG case the probability dis- 
tribution over sets  I p, could be essentially the probability distribution 
over accidents. To illustrate, suppose only one accident was possible for 
an LNG facility. that accident could occur with an annual probability of 
and it would expose each of the nearest 100 people to  a very high fa- 
tality risk of 80%. While the possibility of such an accident results in an  
annual mortality probability of .8*10-~  for each of those people, that  
number alone does not reflect the fact that the fatalities would occur in 
one large accident of about 70 to  90 fatalities, if any occur a t  all. The 
probability distribution over sets I pi 1 can be used to  calculate both the 
probability of fatality per exposed person per year and the potential for 
high-fatality accidents. Past risk assessments have used these and other 
summary measures of that  probability distribution. The SAI and FPC stu- 
dies referred to earlier used among other measures the probability of fa- 
tality per exposed person per year, a n  index convenient for comparing in- 
dividual risks from LNG to  risks from other sources. In the Reactor Safe- 
ty Study ("Rasmussen report"), the risk of nuclear power was represented 
by a reverse cumulative probability distribution over numbers of fatali- 
ties per year per reference reactor (USNRC 1975). One can read directly 
from a graph of that  distribution the annual probability that  the  number 
of fatalities will exceed 10, will exceed 100, will exceed 1000, etc. It fol- 
lows that  such a distribution, often referred to  as a Rasmussen curve, 
very directly indicates the potential for catastrophe. The same type of 
distribution has been used with LNG risk assessments (Hazelwood and 
Philipson 1977). Some risk assessments go one step further and reduce 
the distribution to  the expected number of fatalities, a rneasure reported 
in the FPC and SES studies (see also Pate' 1978). 
C. SOCIETAL PERSPECTIVE 
In contrast to the fairly straightforward technical-perspective 
risk measures listed above, extensive psychological research in the field 
of risk perception has suggested many more aspects to be included in a 
measure of risk that  would be more sensitive to the  concerns of political 
and societal processes (~ischhoff,  e t  al. 1978; Linnerooth 1978; Otway and 
Pahner 1976). Some of these aspects are  listeci and briefly discussed here 
as a way of describing risk from a societal perspective. This section is not 
intended to  cover these aspects in any detail, as they have all been h e a t -  
ed at length in the  cited papers. The aspects are  listed roughly in order 
from the most easily adapted to a simple technical index to the most dif- 
ficult. 
1 .  P o s s i b i l i t y  of c a t a s t r o p h e  
Some technologies cause fatalities that occur one a t  a time, 
scattered widely over a geographic area. An example would be the fatali- 
ties due to air pollution caused by burning substitutes for natural gas. 
While those effects are "spread out" over space and time, the fatalities 
from a major LNG accident would be "bunched" into a catastrophe at  one 
place and time. That bunching can be very important for how society 
evaluates the risk. While the Keeney and Rasmussen measures reflect 
bunching, or  possibility of catastrophe, the other technical-perspective 
measures listed above, probability of fatality per exposed person per year 
and expected number of fatalities, do not. 
2. I n e q u i t y  of i m p a c t s  
An LNG plant that  exposes people in its immediate neighborhood 
to a risk for the benefit of all Californians is a case where inequity is im- 
portant. The air pollution due to a lack of natural gas would be a risk 
spread more widely over the benefiting population, and so would be more 
spatially equitable. A risk that may seem acceptable by an  aggregate 
measure, such as  expected number of fatalities, may not be politically ac- 
ceptable if it is inequitably distributed. 
3. Degree  of contro l  
This aspect is a much more general version of the 
voluntary/involur~tary distinction rnade by Starr  (1969). The central con- 
cept here is the level of participation of each potential impactee in each 
of two decisions: t o  expose himself to the risk, and t o  deploy the technolo- 
gy in the first place. Starr  presented evidence which he interpreted as 
indicating that society has a much higher threshold of acceptability for 
risks involving voluntary exposure than for risks incurred involuntarily. 
Arguments against that hypothesis have appeared in the literature. most 
recently in the paper by Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein (1980), which 
concludes that  apparent aversion to involuntary risk can be bet ter  ex- 
plained by the higher potential for catastrophe and inequity that often 
acconlpany that type of risk. However, in another paper the same first 
two authors stress the importance of public participation in the second of 
the two decisions listed above, concerning the deployment of the technol- 
ogy (Slovic and Fi sc hhoff 1979). 
4. Attribution 
This is an important aspect of societal reaction to a risk that  is 
often overlooked because of the cause-specific way risk assessments are 
performed. There is no doubt as to the cause when a person has been in- 
jured or killed by an LNG accident. On the other hand, i t  may not even 
occur to  someone when an elderly relative dies that he may have lived 
longer if there had been less air pollution. Beyond that, i t  would be irn- 
possible to attribute any death in particular to the increment in air pollu- 
tion caused by a low share of natural gas in the energy mix. I t  may not 
seem reasonable in a narrowly prescriptive sense to evaluate easily- 
attributed health effects any differently than more subtly-linked health 
effects. However any more broad, strategic effort to assess the political 
acceptability of a project should take attributability into account. 
5. Non- decision comparisons 
The search for criteria for acceptable risk often falls back on 
comparisons not involved in actual decisions. For example, comparisons 
are  often made between LNG or  nuclear risk and risk of disease, or risk of 
the rest  of the fuel cycle, or risk of smoking an extra cigarette. Yet very 
few people choose between living near an LNG plant and exposure to risk 
of disease. The latter risk is always there. as is the risk of the rest  of the 
fuel cycle, so the LNG risk adds to it. Perhaps even fewer people choose 
between living near an LNG plant and smoking an extra cigarette, though 
that decision involves some interesting interactions. Yet the use of such 
benchmarks in evaluating societal risk may be helpful in placing assess- 
ments of risks in more meaningful terrrls than probabilistic measures 
(Lichtenstein e t  al. 1978). 
6. Non- probabilistic evaluation 
Perhaps the most serious mismatch between technical and so- 
cietal perspectives lies in the societal sensitivity to descriptions of severe 
outcomes with no regard for the estimated probability for those out- 
comes. This aspect may have been a key one in the rejection of the Ox- 
nard site mentioned earlier. Worst case scenarios. with uncalculated but 
extremely low probabilities, seemed to be effective in furthering opposi- 
tion to the site. While it may be tempting to  consider this an example of 
faulty information processing, of misuse of technical information, in fact 
there are  reasonable justifications for this aspect of risk evaluation: 
doubt in the ability of probabilistic assessments to avoid underestimating 
probabilities of accidents, sensitivity to the feeling of dread that  could ac- 
company living in the shadow of a vividly described catastrophe, or desire 
for a resilient, soc:ial system. I-Iowever, this aspect of risk evaluation is 
directly incompatible with the probabilistic orientation of any of th.e 
technical-perspective risk measures listed above. One difficu1.t~ with any 
prescriptive evaluation incorporating this aspect is that  the most severe 
outcome described is dependent upon the imagination and motivation of 
the analyst. Yet once again, any attempt to gauge the political accepta- 
bility of a risk should take this aspect into account. 
7. Indirect effects 
Some aspects of a technology having little to do with possible 
health effects may have a great  deal to  do with a societal evaluation of 
risk. Those aspects include the  degree of centralization, how closely a 
new technology is linked with a high-consumption lifestyle, etc.  While 
these aspects seem far removed from evaluating the' risk t o  life and limb 
of LNG, they should be included in any effort to understand possible oppo- 
sition to an LNG site. 
D. IMPLICATIONS O F  THE TWO PERSPECTIVES 
The difference between the two perspectives on risk described 
above may have very direct relevance for the role of a risk assessment in 
a political risk management process. This is illustrated by t.he LNG siting 
example given in the introduction. The SAI and FPC risk assessments 
could be viewed as  adopting the technical perspective. While parts  of the 
SES assessment adopted that  same technical perspective, other parts  in- 
cluded worst case scenarios tha t  caught the  attention of people with a so- 
cietal perspective. While the gas company and regulatory agencies were 
planning on the basis of the technical perspective of risk, the political 
process they had to deal with was quite naturally sensitive to  the societal 
perspective. The result: probabilistic risk assessments were not effective 
in guiding the gas company a.nd regulators, nor were those assessments 
persuasive in the political process. From the other point of view, the pol- 
itical process was not aided by the analytic effort that  went into the SAI 
and FPC assessments. Clearly, no party was served by the mismatch 
between the technical perspectives of the  probabilistic risk assessments 
and the societal perspective of the political process. Just as  clearly, if 
risk assessrnents are to serve the  applicant seeking to site a hazardous 
facility and the political process seeking to manage the resulting risk, 
then either the assessments should adopt more of a societal perspective 
of risk, or the political process should adapt itself to  assessing risks from 
a more technical perspective. 
As the previous paragraphs have made clear, there are many 
more aspects t o  the evaluation of societal risk than summary measures 
of probability distributior~s on health effects. The limited measures of 
past probabilistic risk assessments make i t  easy t o  suggest tha t  adding 
more evaluation dimensions t o  an assessment will then provide more use- 
ful guidance to the parties in the siting process. In fact, decision analysts 
have proposed significant and interesting ways t o  expand probabilistic 
risk assessments to explicitly incorporate dimensions that represent; so- 
cietal concerns (Bodily 1980; Keeney 1.980 a,b). These approaches a re  
based on mu1tiattri.but.e utility analysis, which can generate evalua.tion 
functions that not only represent value tradeoffs between several dimen- 
sions, but also represent attitudes toward uncertainty (Keeney and Raiffa 
1976). Such functions seem to  hold great promise for bringing more of a 
societal perspective to risk assessments, making those assessrnents nlore 
useful and used. However, as  the next sections demonstrate, there are  
more fundamental problems in the interface between risk assessment 
and the  political process than a lack of dimensions. 
111. DIFFERENCES IN APPROACHES TO RISK MANAGEMENT 
Beyond differences in how risks are  evaluated, political organi- 
zations cope with the uncertainties inherent in risk management in ways 
very different from that assumed in typical risk assessments. There a re  
two types of uncertainty involved. First, there is uncertainty in the  out- 
come of any action since the future is full of unknowns, accidents may or 
may not  happen, physical processes a re  not completely understood, etc. 
Second, there is uncertainty in the  results of any analysis. From a partic- 
ularly narrow analytic point of view, looking only a t  a decision to  be made 
immediately, there is no operational difference between these two uncer- 
tainties. But from a more strategic point of view, the second uncertainty 
reflects how likely the results of an analysis a re  t o  be subject t o  argu- 
ment, or  worse yet, how likely those results are  to  change. The possibility 
of analytic results changing within a few years gives very reasonable 
pause to a government agency about to commit resources to  an action 
with effects spanning decades (e.g., setting a regulation or allowing a 
plant to be built). The next two sections explore how the  analytic and pol- 
itical communities cope with these two uncertainties. 
A. THE 7'ECHNICAL APPROACH 
Expectecl numbers of health effects is a risk rrleasure tha t  does 
not reflect outcome uncertainty, though i t  is sometimes reported with an 
error band indicating analysis uncertainty. The other technical- 
perspective risk measures reported above explicitly account for a t  least 
some aspects of outcome uncertainty, though often the analytic uncer- 
tainty is either not reported or is not clearly reported along with the risk 
measures. as  was the case with the SAI and FPC assessments. Sometimes 
Rasmussen curves a re  reported with er ror  bands reflecting analytic un- 
certainty, as  in Hazelwood and Philipson (1977). In many cases analytic 
uncertainty is coped with by adopting conservative assumptions, then 
maintaining or implying tha t  the reported risk measure is a t  the conser- 
vative end of the analytic uncertainty error  bar. The fact tha t  the SAI 
and FPC assessments differ in many of their measures, while both claim 
conservative assumptions, illustrates that  there can be differences of 
opinion regarding what is an appropriate conservative set of assumpt,ions. 
While the  Lechnical-perspective risk measures discussed so far 
report  uncertainty to varying degrees, evaluation is limited to observing 
how small the probabilities are,  perhaps in non-decision comparisons a s  
described above. In contrast, the decision analytic expansions to the 
technical perspective discussed before (Keeney 198Ob; Bodily 1980) em- 
ploy expected utility theory (von Neurnann and Morgenstern 194-7), which 
incorporates attitude toward outcome uncertainty in t.he risk measure it- 
self. In this type of approach, the  risk measure is the expectation of an 
index (utility) tha t  is a nonlinear function of the outcorne measures. On 
any one dimension, then, if the  utility function is concave downward, 
the expected utility risk measure will discount the value of an option with 
high outcome uncertainty relative to another option with the same ex- 
pected outcome but less uncertainty. In such an approach, analysis un- 
certainty can be gauged by a sensitivity analysis which adds e r ro r  bars  to 
the risk measure. 
In the technical approach, then, outcome uncertainty is reflect- 
ed in all but one of the risk measures, and attitude toward outcome un- 
certainty is incorporated within the expected utility risk measures. Ana- 
lytic uncertainty is represented, when it is a t  all, by error  bars or bands 
around any of the measures, or is dismissed by maintaining o r  implying 
that  the reported measure is a t  the conservative end of the  er ror  bar. I t  
follows that  each technical approach to coping with uncertainty is based 
on one of two assumptions. The approaches not based on expected utility 
assume that  once outcome and analytic uncertainties are  measured and 
presented, the  political process will know what to do with them. The ex- 
pected utility approach incorporates attitude toward outcome uncertain- 
ty directly in the risk measure, assuming that the  political process will 
want to trade off outcome uncertainty with expected outcomes in the way 
prescribed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). 
El. THE POLITICAL AF'PROACH 
The political process, to  the extent tha t  one can generalize, 
often takes a markedly different approach to coping with uncertainty 
than that  assumed by the expected utility risk analyst. Three brief exam- 
ples illustrate this. When the Office of Technology Assessment did a study 
on LNG in 1977, it concluded that ,  in the face of the large analytic uncer- 
tainties. "... decisions about LNG systems shoultl be made on the  basis of 
nonquantitative approaches ... " (USOTA 1977). When the FPC staff as- 
sessed the  risks of two California LNG sites (Oxnard and Point Concep- 
tion), it found the two resulted in different but  very low risks. I t  decided 
tha t  both sites resulted in an acceptable level of risk, then dropped risk 
as a factor and favored the more risky Oxnard site on other grounds. 
When ttie California state legislature drafted the LNG Terminal Act of 
1977, it set a stringent remote siting const.raint intended to preclude a 
worst case scenario anything like the ones SES published concerning Ox- 
nard. 
All of t,he above examples point to the same conclusion: these 
political decision making processes do not take the probabilistic perspec- 
tive of the rlsk analyst, a re  not ready to iricorporate uncertainty into risk 
evaluation in any way resembling the expected utility approach, and re- 
fuse to explicitly trade off risk to life and limb against any other dimen- 
sion. I t  is misleading to refer to a political process as  risk averse in the 
expected utility sense, since the thinking evidenced in the processes cit- 
ed above has very little t o  do with the  expected utility model. The think- 
ing is basically non-probabilistic. In reference to  the  California remote 
siting provision arid the SES worst cases for Oxnard, one legislative staff 
member  stressed that the California legislature could not allow a site that  
could kill 40,000 people. The remote siting provision was a constraint 
used t o  av0i.d any explicit trading off of safety with environmental quali- 
ty, cost, etc. The FPC s taf f  employed similar reasoning in determining 
that  the risk was less than some level, then dropping it from considera- 
tion. In each case, the setting of a constraint was effectively a n  heuristic 
employed to simplify a difficult decision. Of course, the level a t  which t h e  
constraint was se t  involved implicit tradeoffs between safety, environ- 
ment, and cost, as  well as judgments concerning the nature of sites avail- 
able on the California coast, but those tradeoffs and judgments were nev- 
er  considered in a n  explicit manner. 
As with any heuristic, the remote siting constraint imposed a 
probable cost. Ahern, representing himself and not his agency, has main- 
tained that i t  almost certainly precluded sites tha t  would be deemed 
more desirable by any reasonable evaluation (personal communication 
1979). More generally, a desire to preclude the possibility of a disaster, 
no mat te r  how improbable, can lead to decisions tha t  impose financial 
and environmental costs. Ahern (1980b) describes two cases of this in re- 
cent  California decisions. 
IV. THE ROLE O F  ANALYSIS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
It is interesting to consider various modes of risk assessment on 
their own merits. But no ana.lysis exists in a vacuum. Its effectiveness 
depends critically on the  process of which it is a part.  Three critical 
features of that process which can cause problems for the use of risk as- 
sessments are briefly reviewed here. We first consider the disaggregated 
nature of the political process, then examine the two typical ways in 
which analyses a r e  used in siting procedures: in drafting legislation or re-  
gulations, and in hearings. 
A. DISAGGREGATED NATURE OF THE PROCESS 
The most serious problem in the use of a decision analytic siting 
evaluation model, such as  the one proposed by Keeney (1980c), is that the  
decision structure assumed by the model does not match t h e  institution- 
al s tructure making the  siting decision. For example, the most basic as- 
sumption made by the above model is tha t  there is some single, self- 
aware process somewhere making tradeoffs between conflicting objec- 
tives, such as between safety, cost, and environmental quality. In fact, 
the actual process may be such that  those tradeoffs are not rnade by any 
identifiable agency, but a r e  made in the interaction between agencies. 
with each agency only looking a t  a par t  of the problem. 
The California LNG siting process is a good example of disaggre- 
gation. Three agencies were centrally involved in the s ta te  level decision 
making: the s ta te  legislature. the  California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC) and the California Coastal Commission (CCC). The s ta te  legisla- 
ture se t  up the siting process, including a single-agency licensing provi- 
sion intended t o  ensure a timely decision, and a remote siting require- 
ment to ensure public safety. As par t  of tha t  process, t.he CCC ranked al- 
ternative sites, considering primarily environmental quality subject to  
the rernote siting constraint. Then the CPUC selected a site. not neces- 
sarily the site ranked highest by the CCC, considering primarily cost and 
how quickly the site could be developed, relative to the state 's  need for 
LNG. The major relevant objectives were cost, safety, environmental qual- 
ity, and need for LNG as a function of time. Each agency would maintain 
tha t  i t  considered all factors, yet the mandates of each a re  such that  
each paid special attention to a subset of those objectives. Complicating 
the picture still further, two agencies within the federal government were 
also par t  of the process: one looking a t  all of the major objectives, the 
other attending to  questions of national import policy. Add to this the 
state and national courts, and it becomes very hard to identify any single 
self-aware decision making process where all the tradeoffs were made. To 
be sure, the overall process results in some decision, which can be 
analyzed as being consistent with particular implicit tradeoffs, but  any 
similarity between tradeoffs consciously made and those inferred is likely 
to be simply fortuitous. It  is not clear where a decision analytic evalua- 
tion model would fit into such a process, whose tradeoffs should be used 
to se t  the parameters, or even to whom the analysis should be delivered. 
B. ROLE OF ANALYSIS IN FORMING 
SITING LEGISLATION, REGULATION 
One of the observed roles of analysis in siting procedures is in 
guiding the drafting of the relevant legislation and regulations. Consider, 
once again, the California LNG Terminal Act. That ac t  established several 
interesting aspects of the siting process, but  here we will focus on the re- 
mote siting constraint mentioned above. While it could be described as 
an  heuristic, it is set in very technical language (a t  most 10 people per 
square mile within one mile. at most 60 per square mile within four 
miles), with numbers tha t  were based on analyses. A decision analyst 
would be inclined to measure the probabilistic costs and benefits of each 
of various levels of the remoteness constraint, and pick the most  favor- 
able. But in this case, while the legislative staff had an entire range of 
analyses t.o look at, from each of several different studies and experts, 
none of them assessed in any direct way the costs and benefits of any lev- 
el of constraint. Instead, each analysis indicated the maximum distance 
a flammable methane cloud could travel from an LNG plant. The s ta te  of 
the  a r t  in underst.anding the  physical process was weak enough that  any 
of a number of acceptable se ts  of assumptions could drive an analysis to 
any of a number of results. In fact the  results of the analysis varied from 
1 mile to 50 rniles for maximum cloud distances. I t  was not clear which 
se t  of assumptions was "neutral", or which was most appropriat.e for use 
in drafting legislation. No analysis was used in turn to aggregate this 
range of analyses into summary measures to guide the setting of the re- 
mote siting constraint. The drafting of t,he legislation was a mat ter  of ex- 
amining the range of analyses, then making direct intuitive judgments as 
to t h e  most appropriate constraint. In this case, then, analyses were 
used in the drafting of legislation, but only for very low-level inputs tha t  
were not very directly related to the costs and benefits involved in the ac- 
tual decision. 
C. ROLE OF ANALYSIS IN HEARINGS 
The second observed role of analysis in siting procedures is in 
presenting the various cases before a hearing process. There have been 
several hearings in the California LNG siting process, ranging from quasi- 
judicial to  legislative in nature, a t  the  local, s tate,  and national levels. The 
hearings considered every aspect from energy need to  safety to  cost to 
the  relative merits of the various sites. Take as one example the CPUC 
hearings to determine the need for LNG in California. Several different 
agencies presented testimony, each supported by an analysis of a slightly 
different character,  as described by Ahern (l980b). But once again, as in 
the previous subsection, the several analyses showed several different 
conclusions. and they were aggregated into the CPUC decision to  approve 
the terminal without any traceable analytic link back to the testimony 
analyses. 
D. SECTION CONCLUSIONS 
The key feature in each of the previous two subsections is tha t  
in the California siting example, there was not an analysis, but many ana- 
lyses, all suspected of one bias or another, and those analyses were ag- 
gregated into risk management decisions in a non-analytic way. There did 
not seem to be a single objective risk, but rather  more  than one analysis 
indirectly assessing risk. There are analytic tools tha t  could be used to 
combine several analyses into a single source of advice for the decision 
making process. However, those tools, based on Bayesian statistical 
inference, would require subjective judgments tha t  would explicitly se t  
the weight given to each analysis, or to  each se t  of assumptions adopted. 
While this would be a promising avenue to  pursue, it may not be politically 
feasible to  collect those judgments. Beyond that,  it may not be  seen as 
appropriate t o  extend analysis to t h a t  level, as it would involve political 
considerations tha t  are seen as properly treated only in legislative and 
hearing processes. 
V. CONCLUSIONS: FUTURE KESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
The previous sections of this paper have presented basic prob- 
lems with the interface between risk assessments and the political siting 
process. Those problems involve differences in how risk is defined and 
evaluated, how uncertaint .~ is coped with, how analyses are  used in the 
political process, and the nature of the  political process itself. While the  
discussions of those problerns are interesting in and of themselves, they 
also provide insight into the most promising directions for research to 
improve the usefulness of risk assessment in the political risk manage- 
ment process. To begin with, there are of course two sides to  the inter- 
face between risk assessments and the political risk nianagement pro- 
cess. However, the problematic features on the political side of the inter- 
face seem either  extremely difficult to change or not desirable t o  change. 
I t  seems most. appropriate, then, to address the problematic features on 
the assessment side of the  interface. A review of the previous sections in- 
dicates the  most  promising areas for improvement: 
Extend the  scope of risk evaluation measures to account a s  much a s  
possible for societal concerns. 
Section 11 described basic differences in the  technical and societal 
perspectives on risk, and the  implications of those differences. Risk 
assessments typically adopt a technical perspective, and  s o  provide 
very straightforward, single-number evaluations of risk tha t  do  not  in- 
corporate  societal concerns very well. Political processes a r e  sensi- 
tive to  the  societal perspective, but  research describing tha t  perspec- 
tive is not  oriented toward evaluations of risk tha t  provide clear  gui- 
dance for risk management  decisions. Future research  should seek 
to close tha t  gap by developing hybrid risk evaluation aids tha t  a r e  
sensitive to societal concerns, yet provide clear risk management  de- 
cision aids. Work has  begun in tha t  direction (Bodily 1980; Keeney 
1980 a,b),  but should be extended. 
Develop risk management  decision aids that  a re  compatible with the  
essentially non-probabilistic orientation of the political decision 
make r. 
Section I11 described basic differences in the technical and  political 
approaches to  risk management.  The most significant difference is 
the  essentially non-probabilistic orientation of many political deci- 
sions. That is very problematic for most risk assessments,  which tend 
to  be probabilistic in nature. Yet if risk assessments a re  to  b e  useful, 
ways must  be found for their results t o  be expressed in a language 
tha t  t he  political decision maker  can understand. 
Examine analytic techniques for aggregating the  results of several 
different analyses, and select and adapt  the most  promising ones 
for use in the political process. 
Section IV identified the  need for developing analytic to3ls with which 
to  aggregate results of analyses, then went on to enumera te  t h e  prob- 
lems involved in implementing those tools. Yet not  enough is known 
at this time t o  assess the  feasibility of those tools.  That feasibility 
must  be tested by applying the  most promising aggregation tech- 
niques i.n actual  case studies. 
Certairily, none of the  researcti  tasks described here is easy. 
However, the  potential usefulness of improvements in any of t h e  a reas  
would justify the research effort many times over. 
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